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With an estimated New Keynesian model, this paper compares the "Great Recession" of 2007-09 to
its two immediate predecessors in 1990-91 and 2001. The model attributes all three downturns to a
similar mix of aggregate demand and supply disturbances. The most recent series of adverse shocks
lasted longer and became more severe, however, prolonging and deepening the Great Recession. In
addition, the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate prevented monetary policy from stabilizing
the US economy as it had previously; counterfactual simulations suggest that without this constraint,
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No matter what happens next, this seems safe to say: that the recession of 2007 through
2009 will always be remembered for its extreme severity. By many measures, in fact, it
appears even now as the worst downturn the US economy has experienced since the Great
Depression. It brought to an abrupt close the relatively tranquil period, lasting more than
twenty years, that had become known as the \Great Moderation." And for all these reasons,
it deserves a special name of its own: the \Great Recession" of 2007-09.
Indeed, the Great Recession's extreme severity makes it tempting to argue that new
theories are required to fully explain it. And given the prominence of the nancial institutions
whose solvency and liquidity problems grabbed and held the newspaper headlines as the
broader economic crisis deepened, it is tempting to single out those solvency and liquidity
problems as chief among the fundamental factors causing the recession itself.
But while, on the bright side, the extreme volatility in nancial markets and across the
economy as a whole surely has generated action in the data that will be useful in extending
macroeconomic theory going forward, three sets of considerations suggest that it would be
premature to abandon existing models just yet. First, banking failures and liquidity dry-ups
seldom occur as totally exogenous events; this time around, they stemmed from problems in
real estate markets that, themselves, undoubtedly reected more basic macroeconomic fun-
damentals. Attempts to explain movements in one set of endogenous variables, like GDP and
employment, by direct appeal to movements in another, like asset market valuations or in-
terest rates, sometimes make for decent journalism but rarely produce satisfactory economic
insights. Second, recessions have always been accompanied by an increase in bankruptcies
among nancial and nonnancial rms alike, and one recent recession, in 1990-91, also fea-
tured systemic problems in banking that wiped out the savings and loan industry as a major
segment of the US nancial sector just as, today, the future of the investment banking in-
dustry has been thrown into doubt. And third, even granting the possibility that declines
in housing prices and problems in credit markets might have played an independent, casual
1role behind the Great Recession's severity, it remains of interest to explore whether, in the
context of a conventional, small-scale aggregative framework, such impulses ought to be in-
terpreted as shocks to aggregate demand, working through their eects on household wealth
and consumer and business condence, aggregate supply, working through their eects on
the eciency of the distribution of productive resources, or some combination of the two.
Accordingly, this paper asks whether, in terms of its macroeconomics, the Great Recession
of 2007-09 really stands apart from what came before. To answer this question, the paper
examines and interprets recent data with the help of an estimated New Keynesian model,
that is, within the same analytic framework that Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and
Giannoni (2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), and Canova (2009), to mention just a
small handful of related studies, use to consider various aspects of the Great Moderation.
The focus here, however, lies entirely on the post-1983 period. Rather than comparing US
business cycles before and during the Great Moderation, the objective here is to compare
the Great Recession of 2007-09 to its two immediate predecessors: the milder recessions of
1990-91 and 2001.
The analysis suggests, in fact, that the 2007-09 recession has its origins in a combination
of aggregate demand and supply disturbances that resembles quite closely the mix of shocks
that set o the previous two downturns. The main dierence is that for the more recent
recession, the series of adverse shocks lasted much longer and became much more severe as
well. The analysis does point to another dierence, however, relating to the zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate. This constraint on monetary policy became binding during the
2007-09 recession, though not before. And the estimated model suggests that because of this
constraint, monetary policy became quite restrictive, especially during 2009, contributing to
both the length and severity of the downturn. By contrast, expansionary monetary policy
helped, at least somewhat, in cushioning the US economy against the adverse shocks that
hit during 1990-91 and 2001.
Altogether, these results deepen our understanding of recent US economic history. They
2point to systematic aspects of US monetary policy that might be reconsidered in light of
that recent history. And they speak to the continued relevance of the New Keynesian model,
perhaps not as providing the very last word on but certainly for oering up useful insights
into, both macroeconomic analysis and monetary policy evaluation.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
The particular variant of the New Keynesian model used here takes its basic features from
those developed by Ireland (2004, 2007). The modeling strategy thereby follows Canova's
(2009) by using a small-scale model that focuses on three main equations: the New Keynesian
IS curve, describing the behavior of a representative household, the New Keynesian Phillips
curve, describing the optimizing behavior of monopolistically competitive rms that, in this
case, face explicit costs of nominal price adjustment, and a monetary policy rule { a version
of the Taylor (1993) rule { describing how the central bank adjusts the short-term nominal
interest rate in response to movements in output and ination. Likewise, three variables
take center stage in the empirical analysis: output, ination, and the short-term nominal
interest rate.
Relative to the simplest possible New Keynesian models, the framework used here gets
enriched by introducing habit formation into the representative household's preferences,
allowing for partially backward-looking behavior in the IS curve, and partial indexation into
rms' price adjustment cost specication, allowing for partially backward-looking behavior in
the Phillips curve. Again following Canova's (2009) strategy, the analysis here stops short of
adding all of the extra features present in larger-scale New Keynesian models like Smets and
Wouters' (2003), which would of course expand the model's internal dynamics still further
but at the cost of complicating the macroeconomic story told by the theory and thereby
placing at risk the model's ability to distill useful information out of the action contained in
3the data.
The model economy, therefore, consists of a representative household, a representative
nished goods-producing rm, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing rms indexed
by i 2 [0;1], and a central bank. During each period t = 0;1;2;:::, each intermediate
goods-producing rm produces a distinct, perishable intermediate good. Hence, intermediate
goods may also be indexed by i 2 [0;1], where rm i produces good i. The model features
enough symmetry, however, to allow the analysis to focus on the behavior of a representative
intermediate goods-producing rm, identied by the generic index i. The activities of each
agent, and their implications for the evolution of equilibrium prices and quantities, will now
be described in turn.
2.2 The Representative Household
The representative household enters each period t = 0;1;2;::: with money Mt 1 and bonds
Bt 1. At the beginning of period t, the household receives a lump-sum nominal transfer Tt
from the central bank. Next, the household's bonds mature, providing Bt 1 additional units
of money. The household uses some of its money to purchase Bt new bonds at the price of
1=rt units of money per bond, where rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between t
and t + 1.
During period t, the household supplies a total of ht units of labor to the various in-
termediate goods-producing rms. The household gets paid at the nominal wage rate Wt,
earning Wtht in total labor income during the period. Also during the period, the house-
hold consumes Ct units of the nished good, purchased at the nominal price Pt from the
representative nished goods-producing rm.
At the end of period t, the household receives nominal dividend payments totaling Dt,
representing the prots earned by the various intermediate goods-producing rms. The
household then carries Mt units of money into period t + 1, where its budget constraint
4dictates that






for all t = 0;1;2;:::.





tat[ln(Ct   Ct 1) + ln(Mt=Pt)   ht]; (2)
where both the discount factor and the habit formation parameter lie between zero and one:
0 <  < 1 and 0   < 1. The preference shock at follows the stationary autoregressive
process
ln(at) = a ln(at 1) + "at (3)
for all t = 0;1;2;:::, with 0  a < 1, where the serially uncorrelated innovation "at is nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation a. Utility is additively separable
across consumption, real money balances, and hours worked so as to imply a conventional
specication for the model's IS curve that, in particular, does not include additional terms
involving real balances or employment. Given this additive separability, the logarithmic
specication over consumption is needed, as shown by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), for
the model to be consistent with balanced growth. And, as noted above, habit formation is
introduced into preferences to allow for partially backward-looking behavior in consumption.
Thus, the household chooses Ct, ht, Bt, and Mt for all t = 0;1;2;::: to maximize its
utility function (2) subject to the budget constraint (1) for all t = 0;1;2;:::. The rst-order










at = t(Wt=Pt); (5)
5t = rtEt(t+1=t+1); (6)
Mt=Pt = (at=t)[rt=(rt   1)]; (7)
and (1) with equality for all t = 0;1;2;:::, where t denotes the nonnegative Lagrange
multiplier on the budget constraint for period t and t = Pt=Pt 1 denotes the gross ination
rate between t and t + 1.
2.3 The Representative Finished Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t = 0;1;2;:::, the representative nished goods-producing rm uses Yt(i)
units of each intermediate good i 2 [0;1], purchased at the nominal price Pt(i), to manu-
facture Yt units of the nished good according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology






where, in equilibrium, t translates into a random shock to the intermediate goods-producing
rms' desired markup of price over marginal cost and therefore acts like a cost-push shock
of the kind introduced into New Keynesian models by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and
Steinsson (2003). Here, this markup shock follows the stationary autoregressive process
ln(t) = (1   )ln() +  ln(t 1) + "t; (9)
for all t = 0;1;2;:::, with 0   < 1 and  > 1, where the serially uncorrelated innovation
"t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation .
Thus, during each period t = 0;1;2;:::, the nished goods-producing rm chooses Yt(i)











6The rst-order conditions for this problem are
Yt(i) = [Pt(i)=Pt]
 tYt
for all i 2 [0;1] and t = 0;1;2;:::. Competition then drives the nished-goods producing







for all t = 0;1;2;:::.
2.4 The Representative Intermediate Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t = 0;1;2;:::, the representative intermediate goods-producing rm hires
ht(i) units of labor from the representative household to manufacture Yt(i) units of interme-
diate good i according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology described by
Ztht(i)  Yt(i): (10)
The aggregate technology shock Zt follows a random walk with drift:
ln(Zt) = ln(z) + ln(Zt 1) + "zt (11)
for all t = 0;1;2;:::, with z > 1 and where the serially uncorrelated innovation "zt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation z.
Since the intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another in producing the
nished good, the representative intermediate goods-producing rm sells its output in a
monopolistically competitive market: during period t, the rm sets its nominal price Pt(i),
subject to the requirement that it satisfy the representative nished goods-producing rm's
7demand at that price. And, following Rotemberg (1982), the intermediate goods-producing
rm faces a quadratic cost of adjusting its nominal price between periods, measured in terms










where   0 governs the magnitude of the price adjustment cost,  is a parameter that lies
between zero and one, with 0    1, and  denotes the average, or steady-state, rate of
ination. Although less popular than Calvo's (1983) formulation of staggered price setting,
this quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment gives rise to aggregate price dynamics that
are very similar to those implied by Calvo's model, as shown by Rotemberg (1987) and
discussed further by Ireland (2004, 2007). And, according to the particular specication
used here, the extent to which price setting is backward or forward-looking depends on the
magnitude of the parameter . When, in particular,  = 0, then price setting is purely
forward-looking in the sense that there is no indexation of prices to past ination rates.
When, on the other hand,  = 1, then price setting is fully backward-looking, in the sense
that there is complete indexation of prices to the previous period's ination rate.
In any case, the cost of price adjustment makes the intermediate goods-producing rm's







where tt measures the marginal utility value to the representative household of an addi-


























measures the rm's real prots during the same period t. The rst-order conditions for this
8problem are










































and (10) with equality for all t = 0;1;2;:::.
2.5 The Central Bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to a variant of the Taylor (1993) rule
ln(rt)   ln(rt 1) =  ln(t=) + g ln(gt=g) + "rt (14)
according to which it raises or lowers the short-term nominal interest rate whenever ination
t and output growth
gt = Yt=Yt 1 (15)
rise above or fall below their average, or steady-state, values  and g. The policy rule (14)
departs from Taylor's (1993) specication in a way that allows for a considerable degree of
interest-rate smoothing by including the change, as opposed to the level, of the short-term
nominal interest rate on the left-hand side. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) also use a policy rule
of this type in their empirical model of the US economy, while Levin, Wieland, and Williams
(1999) and Orphanides and Williams (2002, 2006) show that similar \rst dierence" rules
for interest rate setting support desirable outcomes across a wide range of macroeconomic
models, including those in which the central bank and private agents are assumed to have
imperfect information about the economy. When implementing a rule of the general form
shown in (14), the central bank must choose the response coecients  > 0 and g  0
in order to guarantee the existence of a unique dynamically stable rational expectations
9equilibrium; the central bank must also choose its long-run target  for ination. The
serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock "rt is normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation r.
2.6 The Ecient Level of Output and the Output Gap
As preliminary step in interpreting the results from below, particularly those pertaining to
the role played by Federal Reserve policy in shaping the US economy's response to the model's
preference, cost-push, and technology shocks, it is helpful to dene a welfare-theoretic mea-
sure of the output gap, based on a comparison between the level of output that prevails in
equilibrium and the level of output chosen by a benevolent social planner who can overcome
the frictions associated with monetary trade and sluggish nominal price adjustment. Such
a planner chooses the ecient level of output Qt and the ecient amounts of labor nt(i) to














reecting the same preference orderings over consumption and leisure embedded into the








reecting the technologies described in (8) and (10) for producing the nished good using
the intermediate goods and the intermediate goods using labor, for all t = 0;1;2;:::.













10for all i 2 [0;1], and (16) with equality for all t = 0;1;2;:::, where t denotes the nonnegative
Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate feasibility constraint for period t. Equation (18) implies





Hence, the social planner nds it optimal to allocate equal amounts of labor to the production
of each intermediate good. Substituting this last equation back into the aggregate feasibility
constraint yields
 = at=Zt
for all t = 0;1;2;:::. Hence, using (17), the ecient level of output Qt varies with the















for all t = 0;1;2;:::, an expression that also conrms that here, as in Clardia, Gali, and
Gertler (1999), the ecient level of output does not depend on the cost-push shock t. The
ecient level of output dened implicitly by (19) then implies a corresponding denition for
the output gap xt as
xt = Yt=Qt (20)
for all t = 0;1;2;:::.
2.7 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods-producing rms make identical decisions,
so that Yt(i) = Yt, ht(i) = ht, Dt(i) = Dt, and Pt(i) = Pt for all i 2 [0;1] and t = 0;1;2;:::.
In addition, the market-clearing conditions Mt = Mt 1 + Tt for money and Bt = Bt 1 = 0
for bonds must hold for all t = 0;1;2;:::. After imposing these equilibrium conditions and
11using (5), (7), (10), and (12) to solve out for Wt, Mt, ht, and Dt, eleven of the remaining
equations, (1), (3), (4), (6), (9), (11), (13)-(15), (19), and (20), form a system determining
the equilibrium behavior of the eleven variables Yt, Ct, t, rt, gt, Qt, xt, t, at, t, and Zt.
Some of the real variables in this system inherit unit roots from the random walk (11) in the
technology shock. However, the transformed variables yt = Yt=Zt, ct = Ct=Zt, qt = Qt=Zt,
t = Ztt, and zt = Zt=Zt 1 remain stationary, and the system can be rewritten in terms of
these stationary variables.
The transformed system implies that in the absence of shocks, the economy converges
to a steady-state growth path, along which all of the stationary variables are constant, with
yt = y, ct = c, t = , rt = r, gt = g, qt = q, xt = x, t = , at = a, t = , and zt = z for all
t = 0;1;2;:::. The transformed system can therefore be log-linearized around its steady state
in order to describe how the economy responds to shocks. Let ^ yt = ln(yt=y), ^ ct = ln(ct=c),
^ t = ln(t=), ^ rt = ln(rt=r), ^ gt = ln(gt=g), ^ qt = ln(qt=q), ^ xt = ln(xt=x), ^ t = ln(t=),
^ at = ln(at=a), ^ t = ln(t=), and ^ zt = ln(zt=z) denote the percentage deviation of each
stationary variable from its steady-state level. A rst-order Taylor approximation to (1)
reveals that ^ ct = ^ yt; since price adjustment costs are of second order according to the
quadratic specication, consumption and output are equal to a rst-order approximation.
First-order approximations to the remaining ten equations then imply
^ at = a^ at 1 + "at; (21)
(z   )(z   )^ t = z^ yt 1   (z
2 + 
2)^ yt + zEt^ yt+1 + (z   a)(z   )^ at   z^ zt; (22)
^ t = ^ rt + Et^ t+1   Et^ t+1; (23)
^ et = e^ et 1 + "et; (24)
^ zt = "zt; (25)
(1 + )^ t = ^ t 1 + Et^ t+1    ^ t +  ^ at + ^ et; (26)
12^ rt   ^ rt 1 = ^ t + g^ gt + "rt; (27)
^ gt = ^ yt   ^ yt 1 + ^ zt; (28)
0 = z^ qt 1   (z
2 + 
2)^ qt + zEt^ qt+1 + (z   )(1   a)^ at   z^ zt; (29)
and
^ xt = ^ yt   ^ qt (30)
for all t = 0;1;2;::: where, in (24) and (26), the cost-push shock ^ t has been renormalized
as ^ et =  (1=)^ t and the new parameters e and   have been dened as e =  and
  = (   1)= so that "et is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
e = =.
Within the linearized system, (22) denes the marginal utility of consumption in terms of
past, present, and expected future output in this model with habit formation in preferences.
In light of this denition, (23) becomes a version of the New Keynesian IS curve, linking
past, present, and expected future output to the real interest rate. Equation (26) depicts
a version of a New Keynesian Phillips curve, with partially backward and forward-looking
components introduced through the indexation parameter ; the equation indicates that in
this specication, ^ at ^ t measures the real marginal cost of production and the renormalized
cost-push shock ^ et impacts directly on ination. Equation (27) simply rewrites the monetary
policy rule, (28)-(30) dene the growth rate of output, the ecient level of output, and the
output gap, and (21), (24), and (25) repeat the log-linear laws of motion for the preference,
cost-push, and technology shocks.
3 Results
The solution to the ten-equation system, (21)-(30), derived using methods outlined by
Blachard and Kahn (1980) and Klein (2000), links the behavior of three observable, sta-
tionary variables { the output growth rate, the ination rate, and the short-term nominal
13interest rate { to a vector of unobserved state variables that includes the model's four ex-
ogenous shocks. Conveniently, this solution can be written in the form of a state-space
econometric model, allowing the Kalman ltering and smoothing algorithms reviewed by
Hamilton (1994, Ch.13) and extended by Kohn and Ansley (1983) to accommodate cases
like this one where the state vector's one-step-ahead forecast error covariance matrix turns
out the be singular (in this case, because with habit formation and price indexation, lagged
endogenous variables appear in the state vector) to be used to obtain maximum likelihood
estimates of the model's structural parameters and to draw inferences about the behavior of
the model's structural disturbances.
Here, this empirical exercise uses quarterly US data running from 1983:1 through 2009:4.
The starting point comes after the sharp disinationary episode that followed the appoint-
ment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979. Therefore, whereas
previous studies including Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), and Canova (2009) focus on
the regime change in Federal Reserve policy that occurred when Volcker assumed oce and
that may have contributed to the Great Moderation that followed, the analysis here centers
on the period of the Great Moderation itself as well as the Great Recession of 2007-09 that
brought that tranquil period in US economic history to its abrupt end.
In these data, output growth gets measured by quarter-to-quarter changes in the natural
logarithm of real GDP in chained 2005 dollars, converted to per-capita terms using the
civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 and over. The ination rate gets measured by
quarter-to-quarter changes in the natural logarithm of the GDP implicit price deator. And
the short-term nominal interest rate gets measured by quarterly averages of daily readings
on the three-month US Treasury bill rate, converted from an annualized yield on a discount
basis to a quarterly yield to maturity in order to bring the gures from the data in line with
the corresponding variable as it appears in the theoretical model. The gures for real GDP
and the deator are seasonally adjusted; the gures for the population and the interest rate
14are not. All data come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' FRED database.
The theoretical model has 14 structural parameters describing tastes, technologies, and
Federal Reserve policy: z, , , , ,  , , g, a, e, a, e, z, and r. Since the
steady-state values of output growth, ination, and the short-term interest rate in the model
are given by z = g, , and r = z=, values z = 1:0046,  = 1:0062, and  = 0:9987
xed prior to estimation work to match the average annualized growth rate of real GDP per
capita (1.85 percent), the average annualized ination rate (2.50 percent), and the average
annualized three-month Treasury bill rate (4.93 percent) in the data with the corresponding
steady-state values in the model; in eect, this strategy estimates the other parameters using
de-meaned data. Also, preliminary attempts to estimate the model led consistently to very
small values of the Phillips-curve parameter  , corresponding to very large costs of nominal
price adjustment. Hence, the value   = 0:10 is also xed prior to estimation; as explained in
Ireland (2004, 2007), this setting for   can be interpreted based on the fact that it implies
an amount of sluggishness in nominal goods prices equivalent to what is produced by the
alternative, but closely related, specication in which price-setting takes place in a staggered
fashion following Calvo (1983) when each individual good's price remains xed, on average,
for 3.7 quarters, that is, for a bit less than one year.
Table 1 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the model's ten remaining struc-
tural parameters. The estimates  = 0:3904 and  = 0:0000 indicate that for the 1983-2009
sample, the US data prefer a version of the model with a considerable amount of backward-
looking behavior in consumption but completely forward-looking behavior in price setting.
The estimates  = 0:4153 and g = 0:1270 imply that monetary policy works to stabilize
both ination and output, though the policy response to the nominal variable is stronger.
Finally, the estimates a = 0:9797 and e = 0:0000 make preference shocks highly persistent
but leave cost-push shocks serially uncorrelated.
The standard errors, also reported in table 1, come from a parametric bootstrapping
procedure based on Efron and Tibshirani's (1993, Ch.6), according to which the estimated
15model gets used to generate 1000 samples of articial data on output growth, ination,
and the interest rate, each of the same length as the actual set of US data. Then, these
articial samples get used to re-estimate the model 1000 times, and the standard errors
in table 1 get computed as the standard deviations of the individual parameter estimates
across the 1000 replications. Conveniently and by construction, therefore, this bootstrapping
procedure accounts for both the nite-sample properties of the maximum likelihood estimates
and the constraints, like those that require many of the model's structural parameters to
be nonnegative or to lie between zero and one, that are imposed during the estimation and
would thereby prevent even the asymptotic standard errors from having their conventional,
normal distributions.
Most notably, the standard errors reveal that while there is some uncertainty about the
true degree of backward-looking behavior in consumption, the data speak rather denitively
about the lack of backward-looking behavior in price setting, with essentially all of the boot-
strapped replications pushing the estimate of the price indexation parameter  up against
its lower bound of zero. The standard errors associated with  and g are of modest mag-
nitudes, implying that the monetary policy response to ination is more important than
the policy response to output growth statistically as well as economically. And with the
sole exception of a, the parameters describing the persistence and volatility of the model's
exogenous disturbances are estimated quite precisely; according to the estimated model, the
greatest source of uncertainty concerns the role of preference shocks in driving aggregate
uctuations.
The New Keyensian theory outlined above works to identify structural disturbances in the
data based on the dynamic eects that they have on the model's observable variables: output
growth, ination, and the nominal interest rate. Figure 1 illustrates these eects by tracing
out the impulse responses of each variable to each shock. To facilitate their interpretation,
the graphs express output in levels and ination and interest rates in annualized terms; the
periods measured along the horizontal axes continue to represent quarter years, however.
16In particular, the graphs in gure 1 show that while both the preference and monetary
policy shocks act like demand-side disturbances, moving output and ination in the same
direction, the preference shock associates an expansion in output with a rising nominal
interest rate, whereas the monetary policy shock associates an increasing interest rate with
a disinationary contraction. The cost-push and technology shocks, meanwhile, both act as
supply-side disturbances, moving output and ination in opposite directions. However, the
random walk specication (11) allows the technology shock alone to produce a permanent
shift in the level of output. Moveover, the impulse responses show that the cost-push shock
impacts more strongly on ination than on output growth; therefore, under the estimated
interest rate rule, an adverse cost-push shock calls forth a monetary policy tightening, that
is, an increase in the short-term nominal interest rate. Finally, the impulse responses for the
output gap, also shown in gure 1, conrm that cost-push and monetary shocks, and to a
large extent preference shocks as well, give rise to inecient uctuations in the equilibrium
level of output. Following a technology shock, by contrast, equilibrium output does not
respond fast enough; as a result, the output gap falls even as output rises following a favorable
disturbance.
Table 2 foreshadows many of the additional results that follow by decomposing forecast
error variances in the three observable, stationary variables at various horizons into compo-
nents attributable to the model's four exogenous shocks. Panel A shows that movements in
output growth are driven primarily by a combination of preference and technology shocks,
with monetary policy shocks playing a smaller but still nonnegligible role. Panel B indicates
that movements in ination, by contrast, are driven in more or less equal measures by all four
shocks, while panel C attributes the bulk of all interest rate movements to preference shocks,
except at higher frequencies where monetary policy disturbances also play a key role. Panel
D shows variance decompositions for the output gap, too. Because much of the variability in
equilibrium output following technology shocks reects the economy's ecient adjustment
to those disturbances, most of the variation in the output gap comes from preference and
17monetary policy { that is, the aggregate demand { shocks.
The numbers in table 2 reect movements in output growth occurring throughout the
post-1983 sample period, during recoveries and expansions as well as recessions. To identify
the fundamental causes of the Great Recession of 2007-09 as well as the two recessions in
1990-91 and 2001 that preceded it, table 3 reports estimates of the individual shocks oc-
curring during and immediately after those recessionary periods. These estimates of the
shocks are smoothed, that is, they rely on information contained in the full sample of data.
Important to keep in mind when interpreting the numbers in table 3 is the fact that while
positive innovations "at and "zt to the preference and technology shocks are expansionary,
positive cost-push and monetary policy innovations "et and "rt lead, according to the im-
pulse responses shown earlier, to declines in output. And to help make clear exactly what
constitutes a \large" shock, the maximum likelihood estimates of the standard deviations
of each of these four innovations, shown before in table 1, are reproduced in panel D at the
bottom of table 3.
Panel A of table 3 indicates that adverse preference and technology shocks hit the US
economy simultaneously at the beginning of the 1990-91 recession. The cost-push shocks
remained small throughout this period. And the monetary policy shocks were largely favor-
able, suggesting that expansionary Federal Reserve policy helped oset at least some of the
eects of the adverse preference and technology shocks on output.
Figure 2 leads to the same conclusions in a dierent way, by comparing the actual path
for output, shown by the dashed line as percentage changes from the level reached at the
previous cyclical peak, with counterfactual paths, expressed in similar terms by the solid
lines, generated when all but one of the structural shocks is \turned o" so as to allow each
single shock to operate in isolation. In particular, the graph in the lower left-hand panel
of gure 2 reveals that technology shocks by themselves account for a large fraction of the
output lost during the 1990-91 recession. Preference shocks, with eects illustrated in the
upper left-hand panel, contributed noticeably to the downturn as well. And the lower right-
18hand panel conrms that the expansionary monetary policy shocks during this period would
have worked, by themselves, to generate faster output growth.
Panel B of table 3 and the graphs in gure 3 tell a broadly similar story for the 2001
recession. According to the estimated model, a combination of adverse preference and tech-
nology shocks caused this recession too, with preference shocks apparently playing a slightly
larger role and technology shocks a correspondingly smaller role than before, As in 1990-
91, cost-push shocks contribute very little to output movements in 2001, though a series of
expansionary monetary policy shocks helped to at least partly oset the decline in output
caused by the preference and technology shocks.
Interestingly, according to panel C of table 3 and the graphs in gure 4, the Great
Recession began in late 2007 and early 2008 with a series of adverse preference and technology
shocks in roughly the same mix and of roughly the same magnitude as those that hit the
US at the onset of the previous two recessions. Likewise in late 2007 and early 2008, just
as before, expansionary Federal Reserve policy, manifested in a series of favorable monetary
policy shocks, worked to help insulate the US economy from the full eects of the other
disturbances.
The string of adverse preference and technology shocks continued, however, throughout
2008 and into 2009. Moreover, these shocks grew larger in magnitude, adding substantially
not just to the length but also to the severity of the great recession. The pattern of shocks
generating the most recent recession also departed from patterns from the previous down-
turns in late 2008 and 2009, when according to panel C of table 3, monetary policy turned
from being mildly expansionary to highly restrictive. These monetary policy shocks, well
over two standard deviations in magnitude, resulted, of course, from the zero lower bound
on the short-term nominal interest rate, which became binding during the Great Recession
but not during the two shorter and milder recessions that preceded it. In particular, the
zero lower bound prevented the Federal Reserve from lowering interest rates in response to
declining ination and output in accordance with the estimated monetary policy rule.
19To isolate further the eects of the zero lower bound during the Great Recession, gure
5 compares the actual paths for output and the short-term nominal interest rate (shown by
the dashed lines, for output again as percentage changes from the previous cyclical peak
and for the interest rate in annualized terms) to counterfactuals (shown in similar terms by
the solid lines) generated under an alternative scenario. Whereas, in gure 4, each of the
four shocks is allowed to operate in isolation with the remaining three shut o, in gure 5
a single shock { the monetary policy shock { is zeroed out while allowing the preference,
cost-push, and technology shocks all operate on output and the interest rate as just they did
historically.
The bottom panel of gure 5, therefore, reveals that if the Fed had not faced the binding
constraint, it would have continued to follow the estimated Taylor rule by lowering the short-
term interest rate another 100 basis points during late 2008 and 2009. The top panel of gure
5 then indicates that had the Fed left room for this additional monetary policy easing { say
by setting a target for ination 100 basis points higher than its actual (though implicit)
target { the US economy would have bottomed out in the rst quarter of 2009 and been well
on its way to recovery by the year's end.
Taylor (2007) argues that Federal Reserve ocials, by failing to raise interest rates quickly
enough following the 2001 recession, mistakenly adopted an overly expansionary monetary
policy from 2002 through 2006 that fueled the excessive boom in housing markets and thereby
set the stage for the collapse that followed. To address this hypothesis using the model
estimated here, gure 6 plots the entire series for the smoothed estimates of the monetary
policy shocks "rt, joining the numbers shown in the far right-hand-side column of table 3 to
those from the rest of the sample period running from 1983:1 through 2009:4.
During the specic period from 2002:2 through 2006:3 discussed by Taylor, the average
realization of "rt turns out to be 0.0002, small but positive, and indicative of a monetary
policy that erred, if at all, towards being too restrictive, not too easy. One important
dierence between the benchmark policy rule used by Taylor (2007) and the one used here,
20however, involves the presence of the change in the interest rate, as opposed to the interest
rate itself, on the left-hand-side of (14). This dierence implies that the dynamics that Taylor
interprets as being driven by serially correlated monetary policy shocks are reinterpreted
here as reecting the Federal Reserve's regular tendency to smooth interest rate changes
over time. Rudebusch (2002) and English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) discuss the diculties
involved in distinguishing between interest rate smoothing and serially correlated errors in
estimated versions of the Taylor (1993) rule; the results obtained here and in Taylor (2007)
suggest, however, that resolving these diculties will be crucial to any eort to evaluate
Federal Reserve policy over the past decade. Curiously, gure 6 points to the early 1990s
as a period when Federal Reserve policy appears to have shifted, persistently, from greater
accommodation towards greater restraint. Finally, gure 6 serves to emphasize once again
how the zero lower bound forced monetary policy to become extremely restrictive, inhibiting
the economic recovery, in 2009.
4 Conclusion
In terms of its macroeconomics, was the Great Recession of 2007-09 really that dierent
from what came before? The results derived here from estimating and simulating a New
Keynesian model provide the answer: partly yes and partly no.
These results suggest that to a large extent, the pattern of exogenous demand and supply
disturbances that caused the Great Moderation to end and the Great Recession to begin was
quite similar to the patterns generating each of the two previous downturns in 1990-91 and
2001. Compared to those from previous episodes, however, the series of adverse shocks
hitting the US economy most recently lasted longer and became more intense, contributing
both to the exceptional length and severity of the Great Recession.
The length and severity of the Great Recession then caused Federal Reserve policy to
run up against the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate, a new problem
21that had not been encountered before. And so, whereas monetary policy worked according
to the estimated model in late 2007 and early 2008 to help insulate the economy from the
full eects of the adverse shocks, just as it did throughout the previous two recessions, it
added to and prolonged the recession once constrained by the zero lower bound in late 2008
and 2009.
All of these results indicate that the basic New Keynesian model continues to serve as a
reliable guide for business cycle analysis and monetary policy evaluation. Indeed, it would be
interesting, as a next step, to investigate how the implications of the small-scale model used
here would compare to those generated by more elaborate models, especially those that build
on the New Keynesian framework, either following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
and Iacoviello (2005) among others by incorporating credit market frictions of the kind that
have been popularly viewed as important in light of widespread distress in the nancial sector
during the Great Recession or following Belongia and Ireland (2010) by including explicit
roles for bank reserves, currency, and bank deposits as alternative sources of liquidity and
thereby expanding the channels of monetary policy transmission beyond the single, interest
rate channel that is present here. Since, in particular, the small-scale model estimated here
interprets the shocks impacting on the US economy during the Great Recession as having
attributes of disturbances to both aggregate demand and aggregate supply, such extensions
might provide a more detailed view of how disruptions in markets for real and nancial
assets aect households and businesses' willingness and ability to spend and, at the same
time, distort the allocation of productive resources across competing uses.
Finally, the results derived here point to the need for a more complete and detailed as-
sessment of monetary policymaking strategy in light of the problems caused by the zero lower
bound on the short-term nominal interest rate during the most recent recession. Goodfriend
(2000) suggests several possible maneuvers that central banks might use to circumvent the
zero lower bound constraint, including charging negative interest rates on { that is, taxing {
banks' holdings of reserves and the nonbank public's holdings of currency as well as conduct-
22ing open market purchases of long-term US Treasury securities, all of which deserve further
consideration in the context of New Keynesian specications that extend the one used here.
Following Taylor (2007), actual Federal Reserve policy both during and in the years leading
up to the Great Moderation could also be compared to optimal monetary policy as identi-
ed by New Keynesian models, so as to better pinpoint past mistakes, if any, that might
be avoided in the future. As noted above, such an exercise would necessarily involve an
attempt to distinguish, perhaps using methods suggested by Rudebusch (2002) and English,
Nelson, and Sack (2003), serially correlated shocks to the Federal Reserve's interest rate rule
from the inertia generated by the Fed's regular interest rate smoothing procedures. Such an
exercise would also have to confront more seriously the result obtained here that a signicant
component, not just of the Great Recession but of the previous recessions in 1990-91 and
2001 as well, gets attributed by the estimated model to technology shocks, implying that
monetary policy's role is limited to helping the economy respond eciently to, as opposed
to insulating the economy from, the eects of those supply-side disturbances. Put in the
broadest of terms, the results obtained here underscore that the questions rst raised by
Kydland and Prescott (1980), regarding the extent to which public policy can and should be
used for economic stabilization, loom as large in macroeconomics today, in the immediate
aftermath of the Great Recession, as they did three decades ago.
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26Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Standard Errors











Notes: The standard errors are computed using the parametric bootstrapping
procedure described in the text; no entries are shown for  and e, as all of the
bootstrapped replications pushed the estimates of these parameters up against
their lower bound of zero.Table 2. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
A. Output Growth
Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Due To
Quarters Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
1 25.9 3.0 59.1 12.0
4 22.3 2.7 64.2 10.8
8 22.6 2.7 63.5 11.1
12 22.7 2.8 63.4 11.1
20 22.7 2.8 63.4 11.1
40 22.7 2.8 63.4 11.1
B. Ination
Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Due To
Quarters Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
1 29.7 26.1 17.3 26.8
4 30.8 19.7 20.1 29.3
8 30.5 19.5 20.4 29.6
12 30.5 19.4 20.4 29.6
20 30.7 19.4 20.4 29.5
40 31.0 19.3 20.3 29.4
C. Short-Term Nominal Interest Rate
Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Due To
Quarters Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
1 54.5 8.6 2.2 34.8
4 86.7 2.4 1.3 9.6
8 93.7 1.1 0.7 4.5
12 95.8 0.7 0.4 3.0
20 97.2 0.5 0.3 2.0
40 98.1 0.3 0.2 1.3
D. Output Gap
Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Due To
Quarters Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
1 41.3 8.1 17.8 32.8
4 40.0 7.9 19.9 32.2
8 39.7 7.9 20.3 32.1
12 39.7 7.9 20.3 32.1
20 39.7 7.9 20.3 32.1
40 39.7 7.9 20.3 32.1Table 3. Full-Sample Estimates of Shocks During Recesssions
A. 1990 - 1991 Recession
Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
"at "et "zt "rt
1990:3  0:0719  0:0005  0:0048  0:0011
1990:4  0:1306  0:0000  0:0150 +0:0000
1991:1  0:0835 +0:0017  0:0103  0:0029
1991:2  0:0444  0:0009 +0:0106  0:0016
1991:3  0:0625 +0:0009  0:0003  0:0008
1991:4  0:1407 +0:0000 +0:0013  0:0015
1992:1  0:0609  0:0008 +0:0094  0:0017
1992:2  0:0352 +0:0004 +0:0043  0:0010
1992:3  0:0858  0:0011 +0:0038  0:0013
B. 2001 Recession
Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
"at "et "zt "rt
2001:1  0:1721 +0:0011  0:0148  0:0020
2001:2  0:0994 +0:0001 +0:0034  0:0031
2001:3  0:1892  0:0002  0:0041 +0:0013
2001:4  0:1381  0:0009  0:0003  0:0014
2002:1  0:0066  0:0007 +0:0040 +0:0005
2002:2  0:0144 +0:0000  0:0043 +0:0009
2002:3  0:0133  0:0004  0:0040 +0:0009
2002:4  0:0481 +0:0003  0:0118 +0:0003
2003:1  0:0360 +0:0017  0:0072 +0:0001
C. 2007 - 2009 Recession
Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
"at "et "zt "rt
2007:4  0:1244 +0:0004  0:0041  0:0019
2008:1  0:1891  0:0014  0:0059  0:0019
2008:2  0:0347  0:0015  0:0040  0:0001
2008:3  0:0532 +0:0033  0:0212  0:0002
2008:4  0:2890  0:0032  0:0114 +0:0023
2009:1  0:0451 +0:0022  0:0192 +0:0031
2009:2  0:0296  0:0006 +0:0046 +0:0036
2009:3 +0:0041 +0:0004 +0:0023 +0:0024
2009:4 +0:0282  0:0006 +0:0089 +0:0010
D. Estimated Standard Deviations
Preference Cost-Push Technology Monetary Policy
a e z r
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Figure 1  Impulse Responses  Each panel shows the percentage-point response in one of the model's endogenous variables to a Figure 1. Impulse Responses. Each panel shows the percentage-point response in one of the model s endogenous variables to a
one-standard-deviation innovation in one of the model's exogenous shocks  Output and the output gap are expressed in  one-standard-deviation innovation in one of the model s exogenous shocks. Output and the output gap are expressed in 
levels; the inflation and interest rates are in annualized terms  Periods along the horizontal axes correspond to quarter years levels; the inflation and interest rates are in annualized terms. Periods along the horizontal axes correspond to quarter years.Figure 2. Counterfactual Output Paths: 1990-1991 Recession. Each panel compares the actual path
for output (dashed line) to the counterfactual path (solid line) when changes in output
are driven by the single shock indicated. Both the actual and counterfactual output paths
are expressed as percentage deviations from the level achieved at the cyclical peak just
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	Figure 3. Counterfactual Output Paths: 2001 Recession. Each panel compares the actual path
for output (dashed line) to the counterfactual path (solid line) when changes in output
are driven by the single shock indicated. Both the actual and counterfactual output paths
are expressed as percentage deviations from the level achieved at the cyclical peak just
































































	    	    	 
	Figure 4. Counterfactual Output Paths: 2007-2009 Recession. Each panel compares the actual path
for output (dashed line) to the counterfactual path (solid line) when changes in output
are driven by the single shock indicated. Both the actual and counterfactual output paths
are expressed as percentage deviations from the level achieved at the cyclical peak just
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Figure 5. Counterfactual Output and Interest Rate Paths:
2007-2009 Recession. Each panel compares
the actual path (dashed line) for output or the
interest rate to the counterfactual path (solid
line) when no monetary policy shocks occur.
Output is expressed as a percentage deviation
from the level achieved at the previous cyclical
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Figure 6. Full-Sample Estimates of Monetary Policy Shocks.
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